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At Issue: The “Muslims in Ethiopia Complex” and Muslim 
Identity: The Trilogy of Discourse, Policy, and Identity 
 
MUKERREM MIFTAH  
Abstract: The “Muslims in Ethiopia complex” envelops three interrelated fundamental 
dimensions in the relation between Muslims and Ethiopia. The first is viewing it as a 
discourse among academics in “Ethiopian Studies.” Utilizing the broader rubric of 
“Hi/storying,”the present article argues that, except for a few lately emerging 
counteractive discourses, it has largely remained unabated. The second view is that of it 
as the policy and praxis of many of the ruling elites in Ethiopian history. The article 
argues that although the expressions of this policy and practice have been changing over 
time, there are still instances of its continuation as policy to this day. Third, and related 
closely to the above dimensions, is the view of this complex as the actual marginalized 
lived experiences and the associated self-perception of Muslims. However, as the 
unintended outcome of this policy, the article argues for the progressively developing 
“Ethiopian Muslims” consciousness and identity. It concludes by tracing and examining 
past and present expressions of the “Ethiopian Muslims” identity.       
Introduction 
Understanding the relationship between Ethiopia and Islam has for decades been of little 
interest to social scientists. The problem even gets worse for the issue of Muslim identity in 
Ethiopia. A closer scrutiny of pertinent literatures shows wide gaps in research engagements 
that aim to bridge the affinities of Islam, Muslims, and Ethiopia. Notwithstanding evidence of 
the past and present showing mutual convergences, many of the past and contemporary social 
scientific discourses favor divergences and incompatibilities. Consequently, the focus to a larger 
extent tilted towards the notion of incompatibility and divergence between Islam and Ethiopia. 
As I will argue, this in turn has led to a dualism in Ethiopian history, culture, and society, a 
dualism that assumes a Christian Ethiopia and Islam as foreign. The externalization of Islam 
and thus Muslims, as I will demonstrate, is part and parcel of what I call the “Muslims in 
Ethiopia complex” (hereafter referred to as the complex). It has three fundamental and relevant 
dimensions: one is the view of it as a discourse among academics in the field; the second is as a 
policy and praxis of the Abyssinian kingdom and/or the Ethiopian state; and the third is that of 
the overall condition of Muslims and the resulting “Muslims in Ethiopia” self-perception.1 It 
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should be noted that these dimensions are not mutually exclusive; rather, they are closely 
related.     
The present article, thus, argues that except for a few recent studies, the overwhelming 
majority of academic engagements still explicitly portrays dualism in Ethiopian history, culture 
and society and thus largely remains under the shadow of the complex. Second, although there 
are certain changes in the ways the ruling elites view and treat Islam and Muslims in Ethiopia, 
especially in the existing Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
government (1991 to present), there are various instances and growing evidences that suggest 
the perpetuation of this complex. In other words, except for some reform efforts in the 1990s, 
the EPRDF regime is still failing to address some of the historically evolving questions of 
Muslims in the country. Thirdly, despite the failure of the ruling state elites and the social 
sciences to respond to the changing circumstances of Muslims, Muslim self-perception and 
identity has been shifting from one of Muslims in Ethiopia to more of being Ethiopian Muslims. 
As I will briefly discuss below, the complex has partly played a role in the emergence and 
development of this shift in the question of Muslim identity within Ethiopia.   
The purpose of this contribution is basically twofold. In the first place, it closely engages 
past researches to see how Islam and Muslims are studied and represented. This paves the way 
for critically examining some of the widely held knowledge and discourses, on the one hand, 
and exploring, if any, continuity of change in this regard, on the other. Second, by 
complementing the already produced knowledge with current evidence and developments, it 
aims to shade some light on the shift in identity construction of Muslims from being Muslims in 
Ethiopia to becoming more one of Ethiopian Muslims. Accordingly, the first part of this article 
questions the dualism in academic discourses. The second part briefly explores the ways in 
which various ruling elites approached issues of Islam and Muslims in the country. The third 
part closely examines the relationship between the complex as a policy, specifically focusing on 
the EPRDF regime and its implications for the Muslim identity in Ethiopia.  
The Muslims in Ethiopia Complex: Engaging the Actors 
The Muslims in Ethiopia complex is a state of imagination, portrayal, and execution of the task 
of disentangling Islam and Muslims from Abyssinia and/or Ethiopia and the resulting intended 
sociocultural, economic, and political consequences. However, it has also produced 
unanticipated and antithetical outcomes. It has been the creative imagination, 
underrepresentation, and obsession of many academics in their discourses and narratives in 
what has been called “Ethiopian Studies.” For centuries, it has been recycled and executed in 
various forms and content by many of the kings and state elites in Abyssinia and/or Ethiopia in 
their physical and ideological combat with Islam and its adherents.  
Above all, the complex has had deeper repercussions for Islam and Muslims in the country. 
These repercussions include at least one intended and other unintended consequences. Among 
the observable direct outcomes of the Abyssinian and/or Ethiopian state policies and practices 
directed against Muslims has been peripheralization.2 In other words, Muslims have been made 
to suffer from marginalization, discrimination, oppression, and underrepresentation, especially 
in the country’s economic and political institutions.3 This in turn had its own other outcomes. 
Among other things is the development of an inferiority complex among Muslims. In the words 
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of Østebø, “Through a largely derogatory categorization of the Muslims by the Christian other, 
the former has developed a distinct self-definition seeing themselves as inferior to the latter.”4 
Put simply, the complex reflects, on the one hand, the actual socio-economic and political 
conditions of Muslims, and on the other the associated low self-perception, strangeness, and 
feeling of alienation.  
In spite of this, the complex had set in motion a trajectory that has more far-reaching 
consequences than those direct intentional interventions and their consequences. While the state 
elites and kings have been pursuing the policy of peripheralization of Muslims in the country, 
portions of the Muslim population, especially Muslim soldiers and their sultanates, religious, 
and intellectual leaders, by mobilizing and building local resistance, have struggled and fought 
back to defend their cultural, religious, and human rights and identities. This unintended 
repercussion of the Muslims in Ethiopia project of the subsequent ruling elites later developed 
into questions of identity, of Islam, and of Muslims’ role and status in Abyssinia and/Ethiopia. 
The following sections will attempt specifically to shed some light on this and the above two 
dimensions of the complex: as discourse among academics; the complex and the ruling elites; 
and finally, the issue of Muslim identity.    
The Muslims in Ethiopia Complex as a Discourse 
Discourses play significant role in shaping our worldviews and understanding in multiple 
ways. For Foucault, discourses operate in four fundamental ways.5 The first is when they create 
a world. They do so primarily by bringing together a wide array of associations and by 
organizing our interaction with the world around us that create meaningful understandings. 
The second is when they produce knowledge and the “truth.” In this context, for instance, 
“certain discourses in certain contexts have the power to convince people to accept statements 
as true.”6 The third is whenever a discourse exists there is an equally important issue in human 
social existence, power. In other words, discourses and power are highly inseparable to an 
extent that any discourse assumes power. The fourth is when they uncover not only what it is 
being communicated, but also, and most importantly, who is communicating.   
Of the above four important ways in which discourses operate, the first three are especially 
important in framing how the Muslims in Ethiopia complex is discursively constructed, 
reproduced, and sustained over a long period of time in Ethiopia. Many of the academics, from 
within and abroad, who have studied and written about Abyssinian and/or Ethiopian history, 
culture, and society have produced their own version of history, culture and society with 
certain identifiable features. One is the creation of a new world for the country. They have 
created a country and society, in essence, a different version of Abyssinia and/or Ethiopia that 
has lost much of its touch with its existing and observable realities on the ground. They have 
created, in their discourses and narratives, an over essentialized, homogenous and “thousands 
years old” intact culture and society that has disentangled, partly or completely, aspects of an 
equally important body of history, culture and society. The second and closely related with the 
first is the creation of knowledge and the “truth.” One is the creation of dualism in Ethiopian 
history, culture, and society. It assumes the local, Christian Abyssinia and/or Ethiopia and the 
alien, foreign Islam and Muslims. This and related other discursive formations, however, 
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underpin omissions and commissions, false dichotomies, double standards, and generally what 
has recently been called “hi/storying.”7  
Lastly, the complex also reflects the intrinsic discourse-power relations. In this regard, 
questions worth asking include who says what, for whom, why, and under what circumstance. 
As I will note below, the production of knowledge especially in the areas of Abyssinian and/or 
Ethiopian history, culture, and society has been largely monopolized by academic elites with 
certain common features. Generally speaking, they focus on the northern section of the present 
day Ethiopia, specifically the Amhara and Tigray people, Christianity as a religion, and the 
simultaneous and inseparable peripheralization of other relevant cultures and peoples. In 
addition, these academics have been largely partisans and many of them were either followers 
or sympathizers of the Orthodox Church.8 Owing to this and related biases, scholarly 
engagements in the Ethiopian studies, especially studies focusing on Islam, Christianity and 
Ethiopia have been largely entangled with “inherent biases and unfounded assumptions.”9     
In short, the Muslims in Ethiopia complex as discourse has largely remained unabated 
except for barely sufficient writings and publications in the twenty-first century. The following 
section examines the this discourse under the broader rubric of “Hi/storying” as an exemplary 
discourse among academics and ends with a brief remark on its continuity and/or rupture at 
this particular point in time.     
“Hi/storying” as an Exemplary Discourse  
One key aspect of the Muslims in Ethiopia complex among Ethiopian Studies academics is 
“Hi/storying.” As a discourse, it entails the “simultaneousness and inseparability of the 
processes of “telling” the “hi/story” and making it.”10 These two processes, namely, “telling” 
and “making,” broadly encompasses mechanisms, intended or unintended, of double 
standards, omissions and commissions, “un-Ethiopianizing” narratives, false dichotomies, 
unfounded claims and speculations, and other elements. Let’s closely examine some of these 
mechanisms of “telling” and “making” of Abyssinian and/or Ethiopian history, culture, and 
society and see how they feed into the dualist and incompatibility model.     
For one thing, much of the social science research in general and Ethiopian historiography 
in particular that claim to address the relation between Islam and Ethiopia generally exhibit 
“un-Ethiopianizing” academic discourse. This has been grounded in the idea that Islam and 
Ethiopia have a “compatibility problem.” It primarily views Islam ” as an external political 
force, rather than being one of the essential elements of Ethiopian culture . . . [And] firm and 
persistent reluctance to conceive of, let alone recognize, a history of Islam in Ethiopia” (emphasis 
added).11 In other words, Islam and/or Muslims represented an alien or foreign entity with 
different culture, history and identity while Abyssinia and/or Ethiopia represented a society or 
culture subsuming Christianity, peculiar history of civilization, and composed of two major 
ethnic groups, the Amhara and Tigray. By this discursive formation, the “Ethiopian Studies” 
was running the risk of un-Ethiopianizing an equally important body of history, culture and 
society.12 It is this academic discourse that I have called above the dualism in Ethiopian history, 
culture, and society. The “persistent reluctance” of the un-Ethiopianizing discourse was not, 
however, without a consequence. For instance, there is ample evidence that suggests a general 
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tendency among these scholars not to even recognize Islamic studies under the broader scheme 
of Ethiopian studies.13                                  
Closer to the above discourse under hi/storying is the proliferation of ungrounded claims 
and speculations in “Ethiopian Studies.” One good example in this regard would be the claim 
that Islam represents a hostile external religion that paved its way into the Christian other, 
Abyssinia and/or Ethiopia.14 This view primarily presupposes the recurrent frictions sustained 
overtime between the Muslims and Christians in the country, especially in the years between 
the tenth and twentieth century. For Hagai Erlich, however, the hostility of Islam and thus 
Muslims against “Christian Ethiopia” is closely wrapped up with the very ontology of Islam. I 
will briefly comment on two of his accounts for the very genesis of the Islam vs. Christian 
Ethiopia divide.                  
The first dubious account revolves around a Hadith where “A lean-legged from among the 
Ethiopians [dhu al-suwayqatayn] will [eventually] destroy the Ka`aba.”15 From this hadith, Erlich 
concludes that the “image of the Ethiopians as the ultimate enemies of Islam was consequently 
preserved.”16 The key question then, however, is “Is that actually the case?” The claim is 
erroneous for two important reasons. For one thing, the Hadith does not mention or even 
imply, in any way, of Ethiopians in the future destruction of Ka’aba. It just only, and does so 
explicitly, mention “a lean-legged” from among the Ethiopians, singular not plural, an 
individual not society. In fact, an extended version of the same Hadith reported in another 
tradition states: “A man from Ethiopia with two lean legs will destroy the Ka'bah, take away its 
treasures and remove its covers. As if I were looking at him, he is a bald man with crooked arms 
and legs who is attacking the Ka'bah with his iron shovel and pickaxe.”17 Obviously, the essence 
and only message of the aforementioned Hadith is that there will be a “burglar” who is an 
Ethiopian by origin.  Second, and more importantly, no mention of this person’s religion, Islam 
or Christianity, is to be found in this Hadith. In other words, the Hadith does not assume a 
Christian Ethiopian going after the Ka’aba of Islam.              
Erlich’s second piece of evidence for the foreign Islam vs. Christian Ethiopia divide is from 
the Qur’an. Similar to the above Hadith, the chapter Erlich picked up from the Qur’an also 
addresses the issue of tearing down the Ka’aba. Presumably, Erlich understood the weight of an 
argument that can be linked to the Qur’an, which is generally believed to be stronger than 
prophetic traditions like Hadith. However, his reading of the Surah or chapter of the Qur’an is 
as misleading as his reading of the aforementioned Hadith. The chapter is called “Surah of the 
Elephants.” He interprets, I would rather argue transforms, the Surah of the Elephants as an 
encounter wherein “ The Ka’aba . . . was miraculously saved from the Ethiopians as Allah “sent 
against them birds in flocks (abablis)…who hurled clay stones upon them.”18 The problem with 
this assertion, time and again, is its simplistic projection and transfer of the line of argument. In 
other words, just exactly like the above Hadith, Erlich projects and squeezes “Ethiopia” out of 
the “owners of the Elephant.” Put simply, when the Qur’an mentions the owners of the 
Elephant who came to destroy Ka’aba, Erlich categorically imagines Ethiopian society. 
Secondly, it must be clear by now that it is not that the Ka’aba was “saved from Ethiopians;” 
rather, it was saved from the “owners of the Elephant” who were intending to destroy it.  
Apart from the above inadequacies, it should be noted that in either of the above cases, the 
quoted Hadith and the Surah from the Qur’an do not necessarily assume “Ethiopia,” and if it 
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should, it must be Abyssinia. For as long as our latest understanding goes, Ethiopia as a country 
and society is the brainchild of Menelik II (1889-1913) in the early twentieth century.19 
Abyssinia, however, was based present day northern Ethiopia and had some loose control over 
parts of Menelik II’s Ethiopia in prior periods. One of the probable causes for imagining earlier 
encounters between Christian Abyssinians and Muslims in terms of Ethiopia and Islam is an 
attempt to give a shaky genealogical foundation for the incompatibility model within which 
Erlich’s thought operates. Moreover, as briefly noted in later sections, Muslim-Christian 
relations have different dynamics and shape before and after the advent of Menelik II’s 
“Christian Ethiopia” project.      
In short, Erlich’s reading of the Ethiopia-Islam relationship is based largely on the narration 
that claims to unveil the convergence of, and creates a picture of, Islam and Muslims in some 
innovative ways “seeking its [Ethiopia] destruction and replacement.”20 As one representative 
figure of this view, in almost all of his Ethiopia and Islam related publications, Erlich implicitly 
endorsed and “transplanted” the thesis of “Clash of Civilizations” to the Ethiopian case. Similar 
to the twentieth century “Clash of Civilizations” of Samuel Huntington, Erlich joins him in his 
belief in an inevitable clash of cultures, mutually exclusive as per his highly essentialized and 
dualist view of the cultures, both in history and ideology. The cause of this “clash” for Erlich, 
however, is the incompatibility between “Christian Ethiopia” and foreign Islam.21  
The second mechanism, through which the hi/storying discourse operates, is the 
production of “knowledge” and “truth” through double standards and false dichotomies. For 
instance, similar set of actions taken by two opposite forces, especially those involving Muslims 
and Christians in Abyssinian and/or Ethiopian history have been approached and interpreted in 
radically different ways. In the aftermath of these encounters, many academics emphasize the 
victory of Christians at the expense of the invading Muslims or, conversely, foreign, Islamic 
conquest of the native Christian population of Ethiopia.22 For the presumed native Christian 
state and population, a new set of standards or conceptual constructs like “patriots,” “heroes,” 
“peaceful,” and  “tolerant” were created to justify various actions taken against the “colonizing, 
intolerant, destructive, and brutal Muslim” foreigners.23 This binary opposition thus served the 
incompatibility model that only sees natural tendencies of divergences between Muslims and 
Christians in Ethiopia.24                      
A typical and good example in this regard would be the war fought between the 1520s and 
1540s. As a leader on the Muslim side, Imam Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim El Ghazi (in Amharic, known 
as “Ahmed Gran,” meaning “the left-handed”) fought and managed to defeat the Christian side 
in the widely known battle of Shembera Kure in 1529. Later, however, he suffered defeat. El 
Ghazi has attracted much attention in later historical discourses and among many recent and 
contemporary historians and historiographers. This attention was characterized by parallel, but 
opposite reactions from scholars in the field. The great majority decided to label El Ghazi as “a 
danger,” “a surrogate,” “a trauma” and “invasion syndrome” for Ethiopia, “a precursor to 
fundamentalism,” and “destructive” to Ethiopia.25 Ironically, notwithstanding these and other 
instances of hi/storying, many Muslims in Ethiopia and Somalia, in and out of Ethiopia, 
embraced him as a national hero.26   
Closely related to the above is that there has always been a general tendency among 
Ethiopian Studies academics in to eulogize and affirm many of the actions of Christian 
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Ethiopians while downplaying the supposedly “non-Ethiopian” other’s effort and voice. Bahru 
Zewde, for instance, believed that the city of Harar was “occupied” by Egypt, but he 
immediately twisted it into “expansion” for Menelik II when expanding his Ethiopian empire.27 
Like Zewde, Erlich reduced Menelik II’s conquest and annexation of “the Somali-inhabited 
Ogaden desert and vast areas inhabited by other local peoples” to “occupied” while a similar 
set of actions taken by Imam Ahmed were blatantly disparaged as “destruction” and 
representing an epitome of “Islamic extremism” and “fundamentalism.”28 For many of the 
country’s non-Amhara, Muslim and other, however, Menelik II’s aggressive “state formation” 
in the late nineteenth century has been seen as “the “scramble for Africa” on the colonizers 
side.29 While demonizing Imam Ahmed’s actions, Erlich rather euphemistically neutralizes and 
reduces the “Crusader-ness” of Yohannes IV (1872-1889) to something patriotic because he 
acted “in the spirit of the Ahmed Gragn syndrome.”30 To Hagai Erlich, in virtually all of his 
Ethiopia and Islam related publications, the brutality and aggressiveness of many of the kings 
in Ethiopian history, especially starting from Abraha’s encounter with pre-Islamic Arabs in the 
sixth century through Yohannes IV and then to Menelik II, does not have any place in his 
hi/storing.        
By the same token, many of the actions of Islamic sultanates and dynasties, from the ninth 
century Makhzumi dynasty, to the powerful sixteenth century Adal sultanate, and up to the 
nineteenth century Muslim sultanates in Abyssinia, were categorically reduced to “revolts” or 
at times “invaders,” for they fought the Christianizing force from the north, that is “Christian 
Ethiopia.”31  Contrary to the view that sees violence and hostility in Islam, its expansion along 
the four corners of the country had favorable outcomes for some of the population within and 
around Abyssinia. The fast paced spread of Islam in the south, for instance, contrary to the 
conventional view that sees a threat and destabilizing effect in Islam, had served the people to 
tackle forced religious conversions and persecution directed at them by the “expanding” 
Christian force from the north. In fact, Islam was received enthusiastically among this section of 
the society for it had rendered “a new ideological force of resistance against the territorial 
expansion of the Christian kingdom from the north.”32 Islam not only gave an ideological 
impetus for the south but also to others in the country. It was also the raison d’etre for the then 
Oromo resistance in Ethiopia. During those brutal years, “Islam became a sort of rallying point 
even a resistance ideology of Muslims against Abyssinian oppression . . .  in effect, the Oromo 
needed a strong ideology against the well-established state and the hegemony of Christian 
rulers.”33 
In any case, filled with unfounded assumptions, speculations and biases, both the latent 
and manifest arguments of these pursuits under what has been called “Ethiopian Studies” 
paved the way for dualism in Ethiopian history, culture, and society. This was a dualism based 
principally on an incompatibility model that has long been downplaying the convergence and 
unity model that, to the contrary, equally recognizes the differences of all the actors involved. 
Put it simply, the Islam and/or Muslims dimension of Abyssinian and/or Ethiopian history, 
culture, and society has been portrayed as a serious cause of sociocultural and ideological 
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The Muslims in Ethiopia Complex as a Discourse: Continuity or Rupture?  
The Muslims in Ethiopia complex as an academic discourse has largely remained unabated to 
this day except for some lately emerging studies in the area of identity studies, especially along 
ethnic politics and identities, other historical, and other anthropological and historiographical 
works. Of the many ethnic groups in the present day Ethiopia, the Oromo are undoubtedly one 
of the most widely studied, and this has brought with it a visible paradigm shift in 
understanding the past and present of Abyssinian and/or Ethiopian history, culture, and 
society. As it has been called, “Oromo Studies” has questioned the very ontology of the regime 
of knowledge which has historically been ethnocentric and, as I argued above, un-
Ethiopianizing.34   
As for the nature of scholarship on Islam and Muslims, the quantity and quality of 
knowledge production, however, has been scanty and not encouraging. There have been few 
studies with major effects in relation to the already established Ethiopian Studies. To my 
knowledge, the only primary research that had been carried out concerning the different facets 
of Islam and Muslims in Ethiopia and that has gotten wider circulation in the world academic 
community are two PhD dissertations. One is the study by the late Hussein Ahmed, “father” of 
Islamic and Muslims studies in Ethiopia and Professor of History at Addis Ababa University, 
who undertook a primary in-depth investigation into nineteenth century Islam in Wallo.35  The 
second work is that of Terje Østebø, Associate Professor of Religion at the University of Florida, 
on Salafism among Oromo Muslims.36 These and related other recently published 
historiographical research and reviews made some significant contributions by deconstructing 
and reconstructing again Abyssinian and/or Ethiopian history, culture, and society. I will now 
discuss two key observations of the change underscored and implied in these engagements.  
First, these engagements, especially Ahmed’s studies of Islam and Muslims in Ethiopia, 
have questioned the very ontology of Ethiopian Studies. Using the case of Wallo and a closer 
exploration of the origin, expansion, and currents of Islam and Muslims in the region, he has 
challenged the incompatibility model that assumes dualism in Abyssinian and/or Ethiopian 
history, culture and society. For him, the un-Ethiopianizing discourse considers Islam and 
Muslims as an outside antithesis, when in fact they are the product of internal synthesis. In his 
words, Muslim culture in Ethiopia is ”one of the essential elements of Ethiopian culture . . .”37 
Second, Terje Østebø’s studies, especially of Bale in the Oromo region, unequivocally 
established whether or not Islam and/or Muslims have been violent and destructive. He 
produces ample empirical evidence that questioned the misreading of various activities 
commonly attributed to Islam and Muslims by taking examples from the largest Ethiopian 
ethnic group of Muslims, the Oromo. He argued that Muslim religious reform and revival 
efforts have been, for many years, taken to mean the very genesis of radicalism and extremism 
that would threaten the “Ethiopian Equilibrium.” This is thus fundamentally different from the 
general portrayal and representation of Islam and Ethiopian Muslims. Unfortunately, however, 
this general view, on the one hand, fed into the papproach toward Muslims among academics 
already alluded to, and, on the other, the raison d’etre and modus operandi of Muslims in 
Ethiopia complex as a policy and actions of the various ruling elites towards Islam and Muslims 
in the country for many years.   
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The Muslims in Ethiopia Complex as Policy and Praxis 
Next to the Muslims in Ethiopia complex as a discourse among Ethiopian Studies academics is 
how it functioned as policy and praxis of many of the ruling elites throughout Abyssinian 
and/or Ethiopian history. It was used and applied by many of the kings and state elites in their 
hand-to-hand and ideological combat against Islam and Muslims.  
The advent and expansion of Islam among Abyssinians in the years between the seventh 
and twelfth centuries had posed some fundamental challenges, especially to the ruling 
Abyssinian elites. These challenges were primarily political and religious by nature. As Islam 
intensified, converting people in Abyssinian region, its territorial penetration and socio-political 
organizational structures, for instance, the development of Islamic sultanates and kingdoms, 
were also increasingly becoming more visible. This was the moment about which Edward 
Gibbon wrote of Abyssinia as being “Encompassed on all sides by the enemies of their 
religion.”38 Contrary to Gibbon, Trimingham held that the enmity between Muslims and 
Christian Abyssinians was not religious in nature but about political predominance.39 I will not 
comment on the relative weigh of these arguments beyond noting that the interplay of the two 
can adequately explain not only the initial genesis of “incompatibility” but also its mature 
expressions in the later periods.      
By the end of thirteenth and at the beginning of fourteenth century, approximately seven 
Islamic sultanates had been founded: Ifat, Dawro, Arbabani, Hadya, Sharkah, Bali, and Dara.40 
In those years, according to Trimingham, “the actual area of these Muslims kingdoms was 
much larger than that of the Christian kingdom.”41 In the middle of this massive socio-political 
transformation, the Solomonic Dynasty came to power. The Solomonic Dynasty, which differed 
fundamentally in its domestic policies from the preceding Zagwe dynasty, started 
implementing a policy of “repression, conquest and expansion.”42 This policy was the modus 
operandi, especially for such Christian Abyssinian kings as Amda Sion (1314-44), Negus Dawit I 
(1382-1411), and Zar’a Yaqob (1434-68). The pursuit of this policy was, on the one hand, the 
result of suspicion and fear of the expanding force of Muslims, and on the other the socio-
political challenge that this caused.  
The outcome of this policy was a source of constant bloodshed on both sides. The other 
consequence of this intervention was the change in the status of many of the region’s Islamic 
sultanates. After King Amda Sion paralyzed the strongest Islamic sultanate, Ifat, the 
independence of all other sultanates ended and later on reduced to tributary entities under the 
larger political control of the Christian ruling elites. From this time up until the nineteenth 
century, the condition of Muslims deteriorated. Apart from losing their independence, these 
sultanates experienced alienation in terms of religious freedom and economic conditions. For 
instance, Mazaga, which was part of Tigray, had been banned from building a mosque. The 
Portuguese priest Fancisco Alvarez observed this situation when he was engaged in his 
missionary and political activities. He noted that:   
In this country there are villages of Moors, separated from the Christians; they 
say that they pay much tribute to the lords of the country in gold and silk stuffs. 
They do not serve in the general services like the Christians; they have not got 
mosques, because they do not allow them to build or possess them.43  
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He also observed the same complaint among other Muslims, especially in the North, writing: 
“While we were in this country the Moors, inhabitants of this town, were complaining, saying 
that the Prester John had by force levied upon them a thousand ouquias of gold . . .”44 
The accumulation of such political, economic, and religious alienation and exploitation 
paved the way for the sixteenth century massive conquest of the Christian kingdom by the 
Islamic sultanate of Adel under the leadership of El Gazi. The 1529 “victory” over the Christians 
was primarily achieved by the coordination of the already resentful sultanates and Muslims 
living in the different parts of the country.45 Shihab ad-Din wrote that the success of El Gazi’s 
conquest largely depended on the willing participation of Muslims who had the chance to 
reverse the exploitative control of Christian rulers over them. Among these groups were the 
people of Mazaga, who not only welcomed El Gazi’s victory, but also, once the Muslims lost the 
war in 1542, sought the protection of the Ottoman Empire from the newly victorious Christian 
regime.46 Put simply, contrary to the popular view of Muslims besieging the Christian kingdom 
in the years between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Abyssinian Christian kingdom 
rather:  
. . . militarily subjugated their neighboring Muslim sultanates, most prominently 
Ifat and Adal, and politically divided the sultanates’ ruling families to keep them 
weak. These tactics, designed to wrest control of trade from the sultanates, were 
resoundingly successful until Muslims unified around military/religious leaders, 
primary among them being Imam Gran, who in 1531 conquered the Ethiopian 
Empire.47 
It should be noted that the nature of ruling elites’ policy in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
century Abyssinia shifted fundamentally from the previous “expansion, repression and 
conquest” to what I would call purifying Abyssinia of Islam and its Muslims. This was the 
period in which an “African crusade” was waged against Abyssinian Muslims. In fact, the 
ruling elites, especially King Lebna Dengle (1508-1540), believed that: 
 The Franks from the end of the earth would come by sea and would join with 
the Abyssinians, and would destroy Jiddah and Tor and Mekkah; and that so 
many people would cross over and would pull down Mekkah, and without 
moving would hand the stones from one to another and would throw them into 
the Red Sea, and Mekkah would remain a razed plain, and that also they would 
take the great city of Cairo, and upon that there would be great differences as to 
whose it should be, and the Franks would remain in the great city.48  
Following the recurrent wars of the sixteenth century, the country and its people had incurred a 
massive loss of human life and material resources.  
The complex, however, reached its mature expression in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries when Yohannes IV and Menelik II came to power consecutively. During the terms of 
these two kings, excluding Amda Sion’s earlier legacies, Muslims suffered more significantly 
than ever before. Under Yohannes IV, Muslim Abyssinians were given the choice of accepting 
Christianity or face persecution. The resistance of the people of Wollo under Sheikh Talha and 
their subsequent massive persecution and forceful conversion to Christianity was the rule 
rather than the exception.49 Similarly, Menelik II’s vision for a united and greater Christian 
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Ethiopia resulted in the religious as well as military campaigns that led to the creation of 
modern Ethiopia. Pausewang concisely summarized the brutal experiences under Menelik II’s 
campaigns thus:   
[the people] have not forgotten the historical experience of being conquered by 
Emperor Menilek, during the second half of 19th century. They have not 
overcome the trauma of Menilek using modern firearms imported from Europe, 
to crush their resistance. For them, Ethiopia participated in the “scramble for 
Africa” on the colonisers side, being the only African power to succeed in 
participating in the partition of Africa into colonial spheres of interest. They still 
suffer from the deep trauma of being treated as second class human beings. They 
experienced being economically exploited, culturally suppressed, and relegated 
to a kind of sub-human status, by the administration and the nobility from the 
North.50 
 A slightly positive change in policy toward Islam and Muslims was observed during the 
EPRDF regime in the early 1990s. This change in policy, which I would call adaptive rather than 
transformative, was the result of multiple, but necessary factors, of which I will address two. 
First is the late consciousness of the ruling state elites that Ethiopia as a country will no longer 
continue to be viewed through primordial lens, for its people with multiple socio-cultural, 
religious, historical, and politico-economic experiences have their own stake in it. However, 
although the EPRDF regime recognized this in the new constitution, its practical 
implementation has been backfiring in many respects. An important case in point is the Muslim 
movements in Ethiopia, which I address below. Second is the emergence of various interest 
groups in the country: one is the identity question of Ethiopia’s ethnic groups (for instance, the 
Oromo); the second, and the very subject of this article, is the historically evolving identity 
question of Muslims underpinning economic, political, cultural, and religious rights and 
entitlements.      
The Muslims in Ethiopia Complex and Muslim Identity  
After it had come to power, the EPRDF regime introduced its own version of Ethiopia wherein 
“Muslim Ethiopians” appeared to replace the Muslims in Ethiopia complex. The opening of this 
public space had facilitated the way for the revival and expression of cultural and religious 
identities among Muslims. Most importantly, and unexpectedly, this period paved the way for 
Muslims to recollect the collective consciousness of their shared historical experiences in the 
country. There are two foundations for this development: first, the collective pattern of a similar 
experience of socio-cultural, economic and political oppression, exploitation, and 
misrepresentation; and second, the role of religious revival and reform activities that generally 
helped shape the development of Muslim identity as “Muslim Ethiopians.” It should be noted 
that Muslims in Ethiopia, as alluded to in the introduction, has been the actual socioeconomic 
and political condition of Muslims and the associated low self-perception and alienation under 
earlier policy.     
In the first case, the constant struggle of Muslims under the policy of the various ruling 
elites in the past helped nurture a sense of community. During those periods, many “historical 
records, both oral and documentary, testify more to the interactions and commonalities than to 
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the distinct and separate identities of the Muslim communities of Ethiopia.”51 This is more 
analogous to what Karl Marx thought of as “class in itself” in which case the working class 
”constituted in itself by virtue of the similar situation of workers, their common alienation from 
the means of production within capitalism. By virtue of their shared situation, workers have 
similar interests (i.e. things that are in their interest).”52 In this regard, Muslim Ethiopianness 
could be seen then as the unintended outcome of such policy. One practical example in this 
regard would be the case study undertaken among the Wollo Muslims who have been residing 
in the northern section of Ethiopia.      
Rukya Hassan detected and has shown a process of definition and redefinition of Wollo 
Muslim identity. She found that people who consider themselves Muslims and at the same time 
Amhara adopted various strategies through which they demarcated what they considered was 
Islamic and what was not. The Wollo, a Muslim population living within the broader Christian 
Amhara region, developed a modified linguistic system, which she termed the “Amharic 
Speaking Muslim Community of Wollo (ASMCW).”53 This modification is accomplished by 
shifting from Amhara-Amharic, which is Christian in the analysis, to Amharic-Islamic. This, in 
essence, is a dialectical shift of identity marked by religion through which “we” is discursively 
constructed and defined against “them.”   
A more matured expression of this identity has been the product of post 1990s Muslim 
revival and reform activities. Owing to the EPRDF regime’s policy, the post 1990s period saw 
the proliferation of religious institutions, intellectual movements, the production of religious 
materials, massive and intensive communications, and related other mechanisms of revival and 
reform activities. Some of the well-known organizations and associations such the Ethiopian 
Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (EIASC), the Ethiopian Muslim Youth Association, and the 
Ethiopian Muslim Unity Association were established, among others.54 The production of 
Islamic newspapers and magazines like Bilal played a significant role in mobilizing urban 
Muslims along a growing and increasingly recognized dialectical process of definition and 
redefinition of themselves; their role in Ethiopia; and in cementing the social bond among the 
socio-culturally different Muslim urbanites.55 Between 2000 and 2010, a number of other locally 
distributed and popular weekly newspapers such as Salafia, Hikma, and, most notably, 
Yemuslimoch Guday played a significant role for the new generation of Ethiopian Muslims. 
Before the EPRDF government banned it, Yemuslimoch Guday arguably influenced the 
development of collective consciousness among the urban dwellers and educated circles in 
Ethiopia.56 The most recurrent themes of this weekly newspaper were the global and local 
dynamics of Islam, Islamic and Muslim history, Islam and Ethiopia, and other closely related 
issues.  
The progressively maturing collective consciousness along the lines of Muslim Ethiopians 
has been gaining momentum in the subsequent periods with the introduction and 
intensification of social and other communication media. The introduction of a television 
channel for Muslim Ethiopians is one good example. The launch of this TV channel, TV Africa, 
presented Ethiopian Muslims with Islamic programs often accompanied by historical and 
cultural content. With around-the-clock Islamic programming, the channel uses more than one 
local language to get its messages across to Ethiopian Muslims. In addition to Amharic, 
programs have been produced in other widely spoken languages, including Oromo-Oromiffa, 
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Somali-Somaligna, Afar-Afarigna, and Tigray-Tigrigna. In general terms, this TV channel based 
in Sudan, provided Ethiopian Muslims with alternative narrations of “what it means to be a 
Muslim and Ethiopian.”  
Similarly, social media has also been playing a significant role that cannot be 
underestimated. The intensification of interaction facilitated by Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, 
and various websites, with content ranging in focus from purely religious and political to 
historical, have been playing their part in this development of collective consciousness among 
the Muslim community in Ethiopia. It is interesting to note here the role that is being played by 
Dimtsachin Yisema (“Let Our Voice Be Heard”) in the current fallout between the EPRDF regime 
and Muslims.57 It is a key platform for the mass mobilization of Muslims in Ethiopia and the 
Muslim Ethiopian diaspora against some of the repressive moves of the EPRDF regime.  
Dimtsachin Yisema does this and promotes other related activities principally through using 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. 
The message of these Muslim reform and revival activities, as viewed by the EPRDF 
regime, was not necessarily one of the peaceful development of Muslim Ethiopianness. Rather, 
the government alleged that it was one violence, extremism, and intolerance.58 The regime did 
not view it as a Muslim Ethiopianness that constantly negotiates, dialectically engages, and 
responds to the question of what it means to be a Muslim and Ethiopian? The EPRDF regime’s 
reluctant shift in policy towards “Muslim Ethiopians” became something different—in the 
words of Østebø, “from containment to the production of a governmental Islam.”59    
The details of the EPRDF’s moves towards the “production and containment” of Islam 
appear in Østebø’s well-substantiated account.60 It is pertinent to add, however, that the 
supposed earlier EPRDF optimism toward Islam and Muslims was not genuinely 
transformative but more of an adoptive deceit. EPRDF’s recent introduction of “Governmental 
Islam,” otherwise known as the Ahbash sect, partly explains the government’s initial intent to 
regulate or even arrest the growing consciousness, reformist, and revivalist activities of 
Muslims, which thus captures the adoptive nature of its policy. In other words, the change in 
EPRDF policy towards Islam was not transformative and thus was not qualitatively different 
from the previous Muslims in Ethiopia complex policies of earlier Christian rulers. However, as 
the saying “bending the twig twig too far will lash back with destructive ferocity” goes, the 
policy has aroused nationwide protests that have been characterized as “peaceful,” “calm,” and 
“disciplined.”61 In addition, through time, these protests have developed into a powerful 
movement with ”[a] more sophisticated campaign strategy and ensured the peaceful 
progress.”62         
Like the previous complex policies, however, it has created a platform whereby the 
Muslims proactively exploited the friction for strengthening the collectivity among the various 
Muslim communities in Ethiopia. Some of the slogans in the post 2010 mass Muslim 
demonstrations in Ethiopia can be taken to support this. Among the slogans, for instance, 
“mengest bemuslimoch guday talqa aygba” (government shall not interfere in the affairs of 
Muslims); “muslimoch ande nen aneleyayem” (we Muslims are united and will not be divided); 
“Yemuslimoch mebt yikeber” (Muslim rights be respected); and others communicate important 
messages.63 The “production of Islam” induced fear, anger, and response among Muslims, as 
can be deduced from the above slogans, as they perceived an existential threat wit the intent to 
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dismantle the collective integrity of Muslim Ethiopians. In general terms, this reflects, on the 
one hand, an identity boundary for the collective “muslimoch” (we Muslims) and, on the other, 
that this identity boundary has aspects that cannot be negotiated with others including the 
government.   
A closer examination of the existing fallout between Ethiopian Muslims and the EPRDF 
regime lead to two important implications. The first one is that the pragmatic trajectory of 
Muslim consciousness of themselves, the country, and the ruling EPRDF regime. The protests 
which have been carried out since 2011 not only show the shift in Muslim consciousness but 
also their perception of and role in Ethiopia. We see, especially in the demonstrations and 
Muslim produced local intellectual materials, a transformation of consciousness from the 
feeling of strangeness and thus “Muslims in Ethiopia” to more of a proactive citizenry or, what I 
called, Ethiopian Muslims.64 As active citizens also, they have been posing a meticulously 
articulated demand for rights and freedom other. This demand, for instance for religious 
freedom, is therefore an important expression of citizens who felt and acted as locals and 
natives, not as strangers in the Christian Ethiopia or Muslims in Ethiopia sense.    
The second implication is closely related to EPRDF’s policy of the “containment and 
production of Islam.” While the Muslims self-perception went through some significant 
changes, with the unintended lending hand of, but not limited to, EPRDF’s initial appeasing 
policy, the government is lagging behind on the same trajectory of change. In other words, once 
the regime begun implementing the “improved” policy of production and containment, it had 
to deal with the constant protests and demonstrations all across the country, often times, with 
harsh measures of incarcerations, bans, and so forth.  In short, the EPRDF government’s 
reluctance and insistence on not peacefully responding to and addressing some of the demands 
of Muslims in the country has not been changing for quiet sometime, and this would remain the 
principal bone of contention for the probable future. As of recently, the government has been 
taking more severe measures, especially against the “Muslims representatives,” and as such, the 
future may appear to yield gloomy outcomes for both parties.65   
Conclusion  
This article has examined three interrelated facets of the Muslims in Ethiopia complex. The first 
dimension involves the view of the Muslims in Ethiopia complex as a discourse among 
Ethiopian Studies. In this connection, the article applied the concept of Hi/storying as an 
exemplary discourse and concluded that, except for few emerging research studies, the complex 
as a discourse remains unchallenged. Thus there is an urgent need for more primary research. 
Through the generation of primary data from the understudied side, that of Islam and Muslims 
in Abyssinia and/or Ethiopia, the discourses on Islam and Muslims could assume greater 
balance.  
The complex’s second aspect included the view of it as a policy and practice of many of the 
ruling elites, which reached its peak during the times of King Amda Sion, Yohannes IV and 
Menelik II. The advent and expansion of Islam in and around Abyssinia had caused these ruling 
elites to adopt peripheralization and the policy of “cleansing” Abyssinia of Islam and Muslims. 
This aggressive move, especially the recurrent attacks, restrained religious freedom, led to the 
economic exploitation of Muslims, and partially produced the development of a sense of 
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inferiority and alienation. Yet, it also paved the way for the strengthening of collectivity and 
elevated Muslim self-perception in the later periods. The Muslim reversal of Christian control in 
the sixteenth century testified to the expression of collectivity among Muslims. This, 
accordingly, constituted the third dimension of the Muslims in Ethiopia complex, that is, their 
actual inferior and “unwanted” condition. However, an unintended consequence of the 
Muslims in Ethiopia complex policy facilitated the development of Muslim identity as 
Ethiopian Muslims. Similarly, although the existing EPRDF regime appeared to open its door 
for “Muslim Ethiopians” since 1990s, it more recently shifted the policy towards “containment” 
which had its own implications for Muslim revival and reform activities. Despite the 
government’s repressive actions, Muslim identity has been shifting, due to past and present 
circumstances, more toward becoming Ethiopian Muslims.  
As it now stands, the shift of Muslim identity from being outsiders to being stakeholders 
has not been accompanied by a greater degree of flexibility and action on the government’s 
part. Even though the government appears to be taking a stand against its own Muslim 
population on some contemporary issues, the growing Muslim consciousness has sent an 
implicit message that Muslim citizens in Ethiopia will no longer see and live in a Muslims in 
Ethiopia world unless the government recognizes and begins to take actions in favor of 
Ethiopian Muslims.  
Notes 
An initial draft of this paper, entitled “The State and Society in Muslim World,” was presented 
at the International ILEM conference, August 23-29, 2014, at 29 Mayis University, Istanbul. I 
would like to thank Semir Yusuf for his comments on the initial draft. 
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 Erlich (1994, 2009, 2010, 2013).       
15  Erlich 2009, p. 458.  Hadith is a tradition, especially sayings of Muhammad, prophet of  
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 instance, in Abyssinia, but also, and most importantly, had a sultanate. The Mazaga Islamic  
 kingdom in Tigray, the inner core of Abyssinia is a good example (Alvarez 1881, p. 95).  
 Muslims in Wollo and Shoa are another good examples in later periods.     
39  Trimingham 1952, p.65 
40  Al-Umari cited in Trimingham 1952, pp. 72-73. See also Ulrich 1977. The seven named  
 sultanates is the number that it is commonly utilized. Other scholars list greater or lesser  
 numbers. Shihab ad-Din (2003) and Alvarez (1881) include Mazaga, referred to in the  
 following paragraph, as another sultanate/kingdom in their fifteenth century travel  
 accounts. 
41  Trimingham 1952, p. 68. 
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53  Rukya 2008, p. 3. 
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56  “Yemuslimoch Guday” means Muslim Affairs.  
57  For a detailed discussion of the “fallout,” please see Østebø 2013. 
58  Østebø 2012 challenges the “extremism” and “violence” rhetoric of the government.  
59  See Østebø 2013 for a detailed discussion.  
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61  Østebø 2014, p. 172. 
62  Jawar 2013, p. 4. 
63  Personal communication with an acclaimed Muslim activist (requested anonymity), July 15,  
 2015. 
64  See, for instance, Jebel 2012, which is one of the widely circulated books before and during 
 Muslim protests in Ethiopia, Ahmedin Jabal, 2012. Jabal is a researcher, activist.  
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